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On August 30, 1971, Governor Preston
. Sm;!h,ooouored tho .ff"';,, h.giool",
,of the Emergency Employment Act of
. 1971 in Texas. Labeling the new federal
endeavor as "a meaningful program," the
governor observed that it "can be a useful
component to the state's manpower policy
in dealing with problems of areas experi-
,
'encing high unemployment and increasing
welfare assistance." Thus, in a spirit of op-
timism, a new era in modern public policy
was launched. For under this act, the fed-
eral government provides the funds for
newpublic service jobs to be established by
nonfederal levels of government. The
newly created jobs were, according to the
governor, "for unemployed and under-
employed persons in Texas."
The provisions of the Act (more popu-
larly referred to as the Public Employment
Program, or PEP) stipulate that certain
nonfederal units of government shall
directly administer the Act. To be eligible,
the state, county, or city government body
must have a population of 75,000 or more
who reside within its geographic bounda-
ries. Of the funds allocated directly to each
eligible city and county, a portion is set
aside for the state government to adminis-
ter within these localities. In such in-
stances, the state's proportion of the funds
l
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.This paper is based on a study by the pre-
sent author entitled The Public Employment
Prolf1'am in Texa.s (Austin: Center for the Study
of Human Resources, The University of Texas
at Austin, 1972) 114 pp. That study was sub.
.&TIt a mitted to the National Manpower Policy Task
.,. Force and the Ford Foundation under whose
auspices the work was conducted.
tAssociate Professor of Economics, The
University of Texas at Austin.
Veroon M. Briggs, Jr. t
is based upon the ratio of state govern-
ment employment to local government
employment in the area. All cities of
75,000 inhabitants or more are eligible.
When a city of at least 75,000 population
is part of a county whose population
(exclusive of the city) exceeds 75,000
people, the county is also eligible to
become an independent. sponsor. These
units of government which are so de-
scribed become "program agents." For
those counties that do not have a total
population of 75,000 or who do not have
a residual population of that magnitude
exclusive from any municipalities who
qualify independently as a program ag~nt,
the State of Texas is the program agent
for this collective "balance of state"
sector. Originally, there were 33 program
agents: 18 cities, 14 counties, and the
Governor of Texas who has the "balance
of state responsibility."
PEP, in these early days of its life, was
touted by federal officials to Texas of-
ficials as being a pioneering form of rev-
enue sharing in which the federal govern-
ment would supply dollars with a mini-
mum of federal restrictions. Flexibility at
the local level was seen to be a key fea-
ture of PEP. As will be shown, however,
the use of PEP as a prototype for other
forms of federal revenue sharing has
proven to be a myth. PEP has become yet
another grant-in-aid program with all of
the attendant administration and coor-
dination problems that its presence adds
to an already overburdened panoply of
manpower endeavors. Moreover, uncer-
tainties of future funding, recently
culminating in President Nixon's recom-
mendations for reduced appropriation in
S. M. U.
Li\ V; U3~-:;:':-; y
the fiscal 1974 budget and eventual
phasing out of the entire program, have
adversely affected its implementation.
THE START-UP PHASE
When on August 12, 1971, the Depart-
ment of Labor (DOL) announced the
initial distribu tion of funds, the alloca-
tion method and the resulting paucity of
funds became an immediate source of
controversy in Texas. The initial grants
from Section 5 of the Act totaled $600
million to all of the states and trust ter-
ritories. The distribution was based upon
a two-pronged formula that gave equal
weight to the number of unemployed
(not the actual unemployment rate) and
the severity of unemployment in each
state. The two factors, in turn, are aver-
aged to get the state allocation formula.
Under this procedure for Section 5, Texas
received a total of $11. 7 million (or
roughly about 2 percent of the total).
Apparently, the paltry sum received by
Texas was due to the fact that it did not
qualify for any money under the severity
factor for Section 5 since the overall state
unemployment rate was slightly below
4.5 percent at the time of the calculation.
The small apportionment received by
Texas raised strong feelings that the al-
location was mOre in line with political
considerations than economic needs. It
has been estimated that had the Section 5
allotments been based simply upon the
proportion of unemployment in Texas
relative to the number of unemployed to
the nation, Texas would have received
$22 million (a 100 percent increase).
A more serious problem was the rapid
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alteration in the character of the program
as perceived from the local and state
levels. Because of the haste to begin, state
officials were forced to make a number of
decisions in the absence of any written
guidelines. After many of the decisions
were made, the guidelines-and then the
rules, regulations, and issuances-were
promulgated. The net effect of these was
to change drastically the character of
PEP. It became increasingly restrictive to
the point that it could no longer be con-
sidered revenue sharing but rather
another form of grant-in-aid. Hence,
many early decisions made at the pro-
gram agent level had to be reversed and
produced attendant iII-will.
In addition to Section 5, $250 million
was made available nationally under Sec-
tion 6 of the Act during the first year.
Four-fifths of Section 6 funds were al-
located on the basis of severity of unem-
ployment. The criterion was that the un-
employment rate in the target areas ex-
ceed 6 percent for three consecutive
months prior to passage of the Act. Of
the $200 million actually distributed
nationally, Texas received $3,556,900 (or
1.7 percent of the total). No new pro-
gram agents were designated. For those
program agents in Texas which were eligi-
ble to receive funds because they had a 6
percent or higher unemployment rate,
funds were made available directly to be
used at their discretion for residents of
their jurisdictions. For other program
agents in which the unemployment rate
was less than 6 percent, they were eligible
for Section 6 funds if they had an "eligi-
ble area" within their boundaries. In this
latter instance, however, the Secretary of
Labor designated who within the program
agent's jurisdiction would receive Section
6 funds. Under Section 6, all the jobs
established have to be with city, county,
and local institutions. The state govern-
ment cannot be an employing agency.
In response to criticism from Texas
officials over the smallness of the PEP
funds received by the state, Texas sub-
sequently received additional grants of
$120,000 and $1.4 million respectively
from Section 5 and Section 6 special re-
serve funds distributed by the Secretary
of Labor.
When all funds under the Act are ac-
counted for, Texas received a meager 1.7
percent of the total national distribution.
Considering the massive problems of
poverty, underemployment, escalating
welfare rolls, and pockets of severe unem-
ployment in the state, it is obvious that
PEP could exert only a peripheral in-
fluence upon these areas of social need.
Thus, the criteria for evaluation of the
program cannot be found in its aggregate
performance. Rather one must probe
deeper into PEP's presence at the various
state, county, and city operational levels
to discuss its conceptual validity and pro-
gram impact.
FUNDS DISTRIBUTION
Of the $11.7 million received by Texas
under Section 5, $7 million went directly
to the 32 city and county program
agents. The remainder went to the Gov-
ernor of Texas who has two roles to play
in the administration of the Act. The first
pertains to the state agency jobs in the
political jurisdictions of the other 32 pro-
gram agents. The second responsibility
refers to the "balance of state" responsi-
bility. Under Section 5 the governor re-
ceived slightly over $1 million for the
former and $3.7 million for the latter.
With respect to the remaining $3.7
million given to the governor and desig-
nated for "balance of state," it was im-
mediately recognized that in a state as
large as Texas the program could not be
directly administered from the state cap-
itol. In this instance, the governor's role is
largely restricted to a rural responsibility
which extends over 240 counties. Con-
sequently, it was decided from the outset
that the governor would implement his
role through the 24 councils of govern-
ment (COGs) that exist in Texas. The
COGs are voluntary associations of local
governments whose role has been largely
one of planning on a multi-county basis.
Not all counties have ejected to atlihate
with a COG. Prior to PEP, the COGs had
experienced little involvement wiU.
human resource programs. Rather, their
role had been almost exclusively centered
upon land use planning, n~tural resource
planning, and "brick and mortar pro.:
jects." '
FEDERAL REGIONAL PERSPECTIVE
In recent years, the regional offices of
the U.S. Department of Labor (DOL)
have assumed a role of increasing promi.
nence in the administration of the
nation's manpower programs. PEP in
Texas is administered through the Region
VI offices in Dallas. Aside from Texas
there are four other states included
within the region: Arkansas, Louisiana,
'New Mexico, and Oklahoma.
Region VI officials view the Emet.
gency Employment Act of 1971 as having
two basic objectives: (1) to combat un-
employment and (2) to provide pUblic
service jobs to local governments who
have desperate needs for additional em- ,
ployees but lack the funds to hire them.
Although PEP is not seen as a "poverty-
type program" by Region VI officials, a
'
review of the characteristics of the PEP
participants in Region VI for the first'
year reveal that it has reached a dispro-
portionate segment of the poverty and
minority group population in each of
these five states. For example, the com-
parable national program figure for disad-
vantaged participants was 37 percent-a.."
percentage that was exceeded by every
'
i
:'
state in Region VI except Oklahoma (35
percent). As for minority group particiPa-';..
tion, the national PEP figure was 33 per- )
cent of all participants. This percentagei;
.
..
.
1
was surpassed in Louisiana (56 percent) :!
New Mexico (75 percent), and Texas (58
percent). With respect to the pre-PEP
wages of participants, about half of the
participants in the region were earning "
below $2.00 an hour. Almost all of the
PEP jobs have been in nonprofessional
job categories. Also, approximately a
third of the PEP participants were unem-
ployed for 15 weeks or more before the
advent of the program. Hence, it is ob-
vious that the program has provided jobs
for a substantial number of people who
would normally be considered members
of the poverty population of the nation.
With regard to the types of jobs
created for PEP participants, DOL region-
al officials observe two trends. In the
"balance of state" sector, the jobs have
tended toward those in the low skilled
categories and have been heavily oriented
toward maintenance work. Conversely,
where directly funded program agents are
involved, there has been a tendency to
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..leVier maintenance category jobs.
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The area which affords the greatest op-
i'c ortunity for diversity between states is
<\~e handling of the "balance of state" re-jponsibilities. Largely' a roral mission, the
1..balance of state" offers unique chal.
F$nses to PEP. !o. reach the widespread
'y;~a1 populace, It 15 necessary to develop
.
;;janous methods of establishing sub.
:"~ogram agents. According to the regional
':POL officials, "there is no best method"
..
to cover the "balance of state." The
diosen method, it seems, is best deter-
mined by the existing personal relation-
shipsbetween the governor and the local
Sovernmental bodies. Given the delicate
nature of these political relationships,
DOLhas chosen not to dictate any single
delivery system.
The need for separate guidelines, roles,
and regulations for the operation of the
"balance of state" function has been a
repeated problem. Rural programs require
a much more flexible administrative
structure than do urban undertakings.
The guidelines make no recognition of
the basic fact of life that "what is good
for people working in New York is not
sood for people working in south Texas
and vice versa," observed one regional
DOL spokesman.
With specific reference to the "balance
of state" operations in Texas, DOL re-
gional officials agree that the decision by
the state to use the councils of govern-
ments was the only realistic choice. The
vast geographic area to be covered, com-
bined with the limited amount of time
allowed for PEP to be launched, afforded
no alternatives. On reviewing the overall
operations of the COGs, the DOL region-
al office feels that the arrangement has
worked well. Still, they note that there
has been too wide a range in the degree of
emphasis placed upon PEP by the dif-
ferent COGs. Optimally, it is felt that the
state should drop some COGs and expand
the activities of others.
Another observation about the Texas
program as seen by the regional office
deals with the way the COGs imple-
mented their programs. Specifically, they
question the wisdom of the decision to
spread the money around to as many
local governmental units as possible. Of
the 448 employing agents in the "balance
of state" jurisdiction, 266 employ only
one PEP participant, and an additional 79
have only two PEP participants. In many
of these rural areas, the PEP employee is
the only budgeted municipal employee.
Hence, it is feared that many of these
PEP participants will not be picked up as
permanent employees, since there was no
city budget at the outset.
".
(
~
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With respect to flexibility in program
format and administration, the DOL re-
gional office acknowledges that in the
early stages of conception PEP was
viewed as a form of revenue sharing. It
was envisioned as a test of the capabilities
of local government to administer man-
power programs. As the various DOL
guidelines, roles, and regulations were
added, however, its format has been dras-
tically changed. Consequently, "the
simple act that passed Congress has be-
come a very restricted program." Yet,
even though "no one can say that PEP is
revenue sharing today," the regional
office believes that PEP still allows signifi-
cant leeway to program agents. Specif-
ically, they point to the fact that the pro-
gram agents can determine the types of
jobs they wish to fund; they can decide
the wage to be paid (subject to a $12,000
salary ceiling for any single job); and they
can make changes in their plans and in-
form the regional office at a later date.
The diverse goals and numerous defini-
tions used to categorize participants have
caused reporting and monitoring prob-
lems. Misunderstandings over the veterans
and the disadvantaged classifications were
the most frequent source of errors. Rural
programs-whose officials are less familiar
with many standard definitions-have
committed a disproportionate number of
mistakes.
The effect of the hiring freeze imposed
on PEP in August. 1972, after the Presi-
dent's veto of the DOL appropriation has
had a serious impact on the program in
Texas. All program agents have unfilled
job openings. Transitions have virtually
ceased. Regional officials of DOL state
that although the program agents agreed
to place people into jobs, they are no
longer doing so. Because of the inordi-
nately high number of disadvantaged par-
ticipants in Region VI who have been
placed into entry level jobs, there is
greater normal turnover of participants
(due to firing, quitting, etc.) than in
higher paying jobs. Hence, because these
positions cannot be filled, there is a
natural reluctance to transit other people
into permanent jobs. Yet despite their
understanding attitude, federal regional
officials have wisely counseled that place-
ments will determine the life or death of
PEP. If the employing agents stop placing
people, they are only hurting themselves
because they endanger the entire pro-
gram's legislative future.
"BALANCE OF STATE" PERSPECTIVE
The State of Texas serves as the pro-
gram agent for the "balance of state"
responsibility for PEP. "Balance of state"
is defined as all geographic areas outside
the political jurisdiction of other desig-
nated program agents who are partici-
pating in the PEP program. The gov-
ernor's office assigned operational respon-
sibility to the Department of Community
Affairs (DCA).
Actually, there are two aspects of the
state's role. One deals with the state jobs
within the political jurisdictions of the
directly funded program agents in the
state; the other pertains to the delegation
of the administration of the act outside
the political jurisdictions of the desig-
nated projlram agents to 24 councils of
governments (COGs). The COGs' sphere
coverage includes a vast geographical area
embracing 240 counties which were not
directly funded program agents. Essen-
tially, the COG responsibility is a rural
one. Even though hot all counties are
COG members, the COGs are required for
PEP purposes to serve the non.{;OG mem-
bers within their areas. Aside from being
the most efficient administrative pro-
cedure, it was also hoped that the COGs
could be moved from their previous pre.
occupation with planning and non-human
programs toward program implementa-
tion and human resource projects. The
need to develop manpower expertise at
the local level was a prime consideration.
All 24 COGs agreed to participate. As
DOL guidelines, roles, and regulations are
silent with respect to COGs there have
been administrative 'complications.
The distribution of Section 5 money
among the COGs was based upon a two-
factor aIlocation formula similar to that
used by DOL to distribute the money
between the states. One factor related the
absolute number of unemployed people
in the county to the absolute number of
unemployed in the state. The second
factor was a severity factor that used 4
percent unemployment (rather than 4~
percent, as used in the federal distribu-
tion) as its index. The number of unem-
ployed people in excess of 4 percent in
the county was related to the number of
unemployed people over 4 percent in the
state to obtain the relevant factor.
The three most frequent problems that
have arisen in the "balance of state"
phase of PEP have been (1) the require-
ment that no PEP participant can be em-
ployed in an occupation in which any
other employee is receiving less than the
federal minimum wage; (2) the 3.2 per-
cent limitation on the total amount of
reimbursable funds for administration
purposes; and (3) the restrictive limita-
tions placed on indirect costs which are
reimbursable.
3
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The participation of Vietnam era vet-
erans in the "balance of state" phase of
PEP has laggedbehind and been a subject
of concern. They number considerably
below the national PEP target of 40 per-
cent Vietnam era veterans. According to
DCA spokesmen, the quota is "unrealis-
tic" when applied to a rural sector. In
some areas there is a surplus of unem-
ployed veterans, but the PEP program is
too small to accommodate many of them.
The usual pattern in the remainder of
rural Texas, however, is one in which the
number of unemployed Vietnam era vet-
erans is small. Frankly stated, many rural
areas of Texas offer few attractions to re-
turn once a person has seen the outer
world. In addition, as the focus of the
rural PEP has been on entry-level jobs
that usually pay below $2.00 per hour,
these are not very enticing to many vet-
erans.
Taken as a collective package, these
complaints underwrite what is perhaps
the most troublesome feature of the cur-
rent administration of PEP: it is simply
anti-rural as currently administered. As
one state official observed: "The act does
not fit the rural situation." All of these
topics are either nonexistent or easily sur-
mounted in urban areas, but in rural areas
they present serious roadblocks. Recogni-
tion of this basic fact of life through
more flexible administrative requirements
could enhance PEP's attractiveness and its
significance to a large portion of the
needy populace.
The DCA feels strongly that the "bal-
ance of state" program requires separate
guidelines and reporting time frames from
those applicable to the other directly
funded program agents. The DCA of.
ficials feel that the regional DOL officials
have supported their views whole-
heartedly but "Washington simply will
not listen to either of us."
Although there are changes that need
to be made, the benefits of PEP are seen
as far outweighing the costs. DCA spokes-
men exclaim that PEP is desperately
needed in the rural sector of the Texas
economy. The jobs that have been
created reflect the needs of these local
communities. There is no fear that PEP is
a make-work venture.
the rural area contained within STDC
jurisdictionhas an incidenceof pover-
ty and an unemployment rate that are
among the very highest in the United
States.
The mllior city within the area em-
braced by STDC is Laredo. But as
neither the official 1970 population of
Laredo (69,000) nor the population of
Webb County (72,000) in which Laredo
is located met the 75,000 population
criterion to qualify as a directly funded
program agent, the city and the county
fell under the "balimce of state" responsi-
bility of the governor's office. The rele-
vant COG, in this instance, is the Soutl't
Texas Development Council. In addition
to Webb County, STDC also embraces
Jim Hogg, Starr, and Zapata counties.
Having agreed to participate, however,
STDC quickly encountered three prob-
lems that have lingered throughout the
first year: the minimum wage question;
the level of funds available for administra-
tive costs; and the restrictions placed on
reimbursable indirect costs. Tending to
and living with the answer to these ques-
tions have diverted a disproportionate
amount of staff time away from the
actual problems of PEP itself.
In light of the high unemployment and
the stagnant size of the public sector,
STDC's prospects for attainment of the
PEP goal of 50 percent transition is quite
unlikely. Webb County offers the best op-
portunity for transition, but even in this
case the maximum transition rate will be
no higher than 25 percent of the partici-
pants. It is estimated that in the other
three counties, the highest possible transi-
tion rate will be no more than 15 percent.
Thus, the transition objective is viewed as
"unrealistic as a goal and impossible as a
requirement."
The hiring freeze has severely reduced
the effectiveness of STDC's program. It
has unfilled slots that cannot be filled
despite the abundance of unemployed
people available and seeking the oppor-
tunity to participate. In fact, the most
significant aspect of the presence of PEP
in the region is the opportunity it pro-
vides to demonstrate how many people
there are who want to work but for
whom few jobs are available. Despite the
fact that most of these jobs pay only the
federal minimum wage, the records of the
Texas Employment Commission show
that overall there have been over four ap-
plicants referred to everyone opening.
For many unskilled jobs, the ratios were
much higher.
LARGE CITY PERSPECTIVE
The City of Houston was designated as
I
1
..
COG PERSPECTIVE
In terms of the number of partici-
pants and the amount of funds re-
ceived, the South Texas Development
Council (STDC) has the largest PEP
program of the 24 councils of govern-
ments in Texas. The predominantly
Chicano population who reside within
4
a program agent which was eligiblefor
direct funding from the Department ofLabor. Accordingly, the city received
$806,100 under Section 5 and an addi-
tional $432,000 under Section 6 for the
first year. As the city's unemploYInent
rate was below 6 percent, the Section6
money was designated by the Secretary
of Labor to be spent exclusively on res-
idents of the Model Cities neighborhoods.
In late February, 1972, an additional$1
million was awarded to the city from the
Secretary of Labor's discretionary ac.
count from Section 6.
It was quickly determined by the
mayor's office that both the Section S
and Section 6 allocation of funds for
Houston were too small to have any
noticeable impact on the 17,300 unem-
ployed people within his jurisdiction.
Hence, he instructed his staff to focus
upon highly visible jobs. It was decided
"to concentrate the resources on the
highest priority of unmet needs-the
maintenance of public facilities for im.
proving environmental quality." Priority
was given to these low skilled jobs also
because "jobs in this field can be staffed
rapidly from the unemployed in the
Houston area."
From the beginning, there has been
concern in Houston as to why PEP was
not administratively set up to conform to
the recent manpower reform proposals,
namely, as a movement toward bloc
grants given to a single prime sponsor
who would administer PEP throughout
the manpower planning area. PEP runs
counter to this thrust because it bypasses
the Houston Cooperative Area Manpower
Planning System (CAMPS). As matters
now stand, the Houston CAMPS area has
seven PEP program agent jurisdictions.
Program agents, it is argued, should be
able to hire people who live anywhere in
the labor market. Yet, every effort to
have them so classified has been rebuffed
by DOL interpretations. Harris County,
for example, has applied twice for a
waiver for its "balance of county" re- ,
sponsibility in order to give all of its ,:i
funds to the ghetto residents of Houston
~and Pasadena (both cities being within \
Harris County). It was felt by the county;,
officials that the unemployment problem :,
of the county was found within these two
cities. Yet, both appeals were rejected.
The county was told that it must hire
PEP participants who do not reside
within the land area of either city. A
further complication resulted from the
fact that there are II small municipalities
within the borders of the city of
Houston. It has been ruled that these
municipalities are not part of the city,
~
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~d hence, they are the responsibility of
ltarris County and not of the Houston
'fOgram agent. Houston officials argue
,~at PEP, by its nature, defies coordina-
"'~on with other manpower programs and
'ris counter to the previous thrust
ard greater responsibility of program
ort at the local level.
. . There are mixed opinions in Houston
';~ to the prospects of attaining the
:!~tional goal of 50 percent placement of
'jEP participants into permanent jobs. All
'_dmit it will take "very positive efforts"
io overcome the built-in inertia that char-
,i~cterjzes normal employment practices,
i\ssurance of desired placements requires
~taff attention to the issue and an under-
standing of the movement of personnel
papers in the system. Existing personnel
policies are designed to hamper turnover
~nd to minimize job vacancies, but PEP
encourages turnover among its partici-
pants and requires job vacancies if it is to
:':succeed. Moreover, as a civil service
'Spokesman said, "transition can only
'<,occurif openings occur, and since perm a-
"'i1entpositions are public jobs, they must
be open to all seekers." On the other
';.'hand, the most positive feature of PEP is
51'iliat it does provide on-the-job appren-
';~';ticeship opportunities that should en-
(,hance the probability that the PEP par-
lticipant will be hired should vacancies
occur.
Houston, like many other program
agents in Texas, has found the 40 percent
goal of Vietnam era veterans to be
"unrealistic." As over half of PEP funds
are restricted to the Model Cities neigh-
borhoods of Houston, it is reported that
"there are simply not that many unem.
ployed Vietnam era veterans who reside
in that section of town." Unemployment
in the designated areas is estimated to be
just barely above the 6 percent level
needed to qualify for Section 6 funds.
Furthermore, most of the PEP jobs are in
low-wage, entry-level positions which re-
quire little skill. Vietnam era veterans in
the city usually have better alternatives.
"Thus," commented one city official,
"the 40 percent Vietnam era quota is just
another of the impossible regulations
imposed on PEP. You do your best, but
you just have to ignore the quota or else
the program will flounder."
The imposition of the hiring freeze in
August, 1972, has had a serious negative
effect on the effectiveness of PEP. Every
week since it began there have been fewer
, fa PEP participants than the preceding
'-"
week. During the first week of August,
there were over 500 PEP participants; as
of the first week of November, 1972,
there were 300 PEP participants, As
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people have terminated-either through
transition or quitting-they have been
replaced only if an unemployed Vietnam
era veteran could be found. One PEP
official in the city complained tha t "the
name of the program is to employ people,
but we now have about 200 open job
slots." The fact that only Vietnam era
veterans can be hired until the freeze is
lifted was cited as the explanation.
All PEP participants who are em-
ployed by the city are listed with the civil
service, but all are carried as "temporary"
under the city ordinances creating their
positions, At no point do any of the cur-
rent participants secure automatic claim
to their jobs. The director of the civil ser-
vice for the city states that "we are
pleased with PEP, provided it can be
fitted into our existing way of doing
things." He added that "PEP does need to
alIow more discretion to the local civil
service system ," as he feIt that "as things
now stand, they are trying to put round
pegs into square holes. We do not need
any ivory tower approaches." Fear was
expressed by the spokesman that restric-
tion to the poverty neighborhoods for
many of the participants had resulted in
the "lower caliber" of participants in city
employment. He added that "if any
serious effort is made to move many of
these PEP participants into permanent
jobs, PEP will faiL" It was admitted, how-
ever, that "in reality, whether the people
are picked up as permanent employees
depends on their job performance,"
Houston officials did state that none
of the PEP participants currently
employed would have been hired without
the program. It was a very tight budget
year in Houston, with the prospects being
the same for the foreseeable future.
CONCLUDING OBSERVATIONS
In Texas, the Public Employment Pro-
gram has developed along historic lines.
That is to say, it has focused upon
meeting the labor market needs of people
with few job alternatives. Whether it be in
Houston (with its low unemployment
rate), the south Texas area (with its very
high unemployment rate), or the largely
rural "balance of state" area (with its
wide range of unemployment rates), the
job placement and participant characteris-
tics are strikingly similar. Most of the jobs
are in low-wage occupations which have
low educational and low skill require-
ments. As such, primary attention has
been paid to a quantitative goal of serving
as many people as possible. Considera.
tions dealing with the qualitative aspects
of the jobs are clearly secondary. Profes-
sional jobs have been very few in number.
The participant characteristics, in turn,
show rates for blacks, Chicanos, econom-
icalIy disadvantaged, and those with low
educational attainment to be wel! in ex-
cess of the published national PEP rates.
It is also likely that Texas-by adminis-
tering its "balance of state" program
through the COG network-has made a
deeper rural penetration than achieved
elsewhere. Hence, it is not really sur-
prising that problems-such as the mini-
mum wage issue; the lack of placement of
participants who covered civil service jobs;
the handling of indirect administrative
costs; the absence of established personnel
policies; and the unlikely prospect that 50
percent of the participants will be able to
move into permanent positions-should
occur.
Although there has been dissatisfaction
with the small allocation of funds and dif-
ficulties with a number of administrative
matters, all program agents highly praised
the conceptual goals of the program. All
felt that the PEP served a needed purpose
and that it was a welcome policy addition
to their manpower development pro-
grams. All officials were emphatic in their
conclusion that the alternative for the
PEP participants to their programs was
usually unemployment. Moreover, they
stated that the work performed was
socially useful to their communities. Con-
sequently, PEP was seen as a valuable pro-
gram whose life should be prolonged
indefinitely.
The program agents and sub-program
agents are concerned that PEP has
become increasingly a categorical grant
program that is administratively indif-
ferent to variation in community needs.
With its multiple goals (Le., its 20 assur-
ances), it is difficult for many officials to
believe that its primary goals are to
relieve unemployment and to create addi-
tional nonfederal public jobs. To the
degree that PEP has become simply
another categorical grant program, the
administrative guidelines, rules, regu-
lations, and issuances have generated their
own problems: One state spokesman con-
cluded that "it would be impossible for
members of Congress to recognize the
Act they passed if they would examine
what PEP has become," Thus, attention
has too often been diverted away from
opportunities to be creative and innova-
tive or even to be sure that the proper
course of program development for each
locality has been chosen. Simply adminis-
tering to the day-to-day operation of PEP
commands the full attention of most
staffs. As an official of the governor's
office summed up: "Everyone likes the
5
,program, but no one likes the guidelines."
As administrative requirements have
multiplied, the consensus opinion has
developed among many program agents
that DOL is more concerned. with pro-
gram administration than with program
accomplishment.
A fair appraisal of the first year of PEP
in Texas would conclude that the entire
focus has been placed on the numerical
goals of PEP: to create jobs and to reduce
unemployment. In every instance, spokes-
men for the separate programs or levels of
program supervision stress the fact that
the second year (I972-73) will be the
period in which the substantive goals will
assume the highest priority. That is to
say, during the second year attention wm
center on the transitional natUre of the
PEP jobs and on assuring that the signifi-
cant segments of the unemployed local
populace are actually being served.
The imposition of the hiring freeze has
adversely affected PEP operations. Since
August, 1972, PEP in Texas has been in a
state of suspended animation. Although
this period does allow time for reflection
on program objectives, the freeze under-
mines efforts for effective evaluation and
planning. Participation levels and transi-
tion rates have fallen sharply. The fault is
not with PEP itself, but with the adminis-
trative straitjacket clamped on its opera-
tions. Likewise, knowledge of the amount
of funds to be made available to the pro-
gram agents is the first requisite of plan-
ning. All program agents anticipated more
funds to be available under Section 5,
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because they knew that PEP was
scheduled for a 25 percent increase in
funds for the second year. On the other
hand, the uncertainty of the Section 6
program in many of these localities meant
that one could not be sure whether the
net sum of funds from Sections 5 and 6
would be more or less than the first year.
During the first year, planning was pre-
cluded by the haste to implement the
program; during the second year, it is the
hiring freeze and the complete uncer-
tainty as to funding levels which are the
obstacles. Superimposed upon these un-
certainties is the growing suspicion men-
tioned by all program agents that PEP
will not be renewed. It is hard for pro-
gram agents to really take PEP seriously,
if its very existence is in serious doubt.
Although PEP has been operational for
over a year, it is difficult to devise the
proper yardstick to judge its effective-
ness. With the number of people unem-
ployed in Texas in 1972 exceeding
170,000 persons, a program with slightly
more than 1,700 approved job slots
(which have served about 4,000 people)
which are scattered across the entire state
cannot hope to have a measurable impact.
As for net job creation in the public
sector, PEP seeks to transit its partici-
pants into already existing permanent
jobs. So, most transitions are simply
replacements. Moreover, since the hiring
freeze, transitions have virtually ceased in
Texas. Hence, all program agents have
vacant slots which they are administra-
tively forbidden or prohibited from filling.
How is it possible to appraise P
accomplishments under such circu
stances? Unlike virtually all other III
power programs, PEP has a general po'
lation focus. It is not primarily design
to serve the economically disadvantag
although this group has clearly been
beneficiary of PEP in Texas. Likewise
'the goal is to serve the general pop'
tion, how can the strong bias in favor
veterans avoid discrimination aga'
women? It is hard to find a manpo.....
program with a higher male-to-fern'
ratio. Thus, the problem of a multiple
'.goal program is that the more goals there
are, the greater the probability of conflici,;\"
and contradiction.' j~':
PEP has not dented the unemploy-
ment and underemployment problems of
Texas. Nor has it significantly increased
the number of public employees needed'
to service the growing public demands of,
the state. But, after all, the story of'.
David's conquest of Goliath is memorable\
only because it is atypical of the expected'
probable outcome. PEP is no David. U:
did not accomplish the impossible, bu't
that does not mean that the effort shoul~:
not have been expended. The lesson to be'
learned from PEP's first year in Texas is'-
that public service employment is a viable'
concept and that there is a demonstrablf."
need for such a program on a continuing
basis. To achieve its espoused objectives,
however, the funds available for PEP in
Texas need to be increased, and many or~
the administratively imposed restrictions;
should be removed.
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